Authors: Emily Cox, Cardiff University; Keith Bell, University of Strathclyde; Susan Brush, University of Strathclyde
In this submission we respond to the the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy inquiry on critical national infrastructure and climate adaptation, providing a summary of some of the main issues where we have relevant expertise and insights. Specifically, we focus on climate change impacts on electricity infrastructure and on potential impacts on other interdependent critical infrastructures.
Extreme weather events, the frequency and intensity of some of which can be linked to climate change, are bringing new risks to electricity systems. Other critical infrastructure is strongly interdependent with electricity and therefore also faces heightened risk.
In the UK, heavy rainfall, high winds, and lightning are among the events which can damage electricity infrastructure or interrupt supply. An increasing proportion of electricity production is also dependent on the weather. Society’s dependence on electricity is set to further increase, especially for transport, heat and communications. As it transitions towards working without fossil-fuel generation, it is imperative that the electricity system remains resilient, i.e. able to prevent, contain and recover from interruptions to supply resulting from disturbances.
Five types of critical infrastructure interdependencies are considered in this submission:
This submission considers a number of recent case studies of major weather-related electricity disruptions, including Storm Arwen in 2021, Storm Desmond in 2015, and the August 2019 system frequency disturbance. In each case, losses of electricity supply led to failures in interdependent critical infrastructures.
The submission also considers what might constitute an acceptable level of resilience to climate change within UK critical infrastructure. It is impossible to guarantee completely reliable electricity supply. The vulnerability of critical infrastructure to extreme weather events could be significantly underestimated if interdependencies are not considered. One of the most critical is between electricity and telecommunications, with high uncertainty and lack of available data on whether mobile phones would continue functioning, and for how long, and Ofcom considering backup power supplies for mobile phone networks to be “prohibitively expensive”.
We argue that the difficulty of assessing the societal and economic impact of a rare but long electricity supply interruption makes the role of regulation extremely important. The electricity supply industry is fragmented with network companies, generators, suppliers and the transmission system operator all playing roles. Evidence from recent events suggests that the current set of industry codes and standards is insufficiently coherent, up-to-date, or strongly enforced.
The centrality of digital communications in modern life and increasing dependency on electricity for heating and transport suggest that the way society deals with interruptions to electricity supply is of increasing importance. Societal patterns of resilience and vulnerability are complex. Local, community and grassroots organisations and arrangements such as Local Resilience Forums or Local Resilience Partnerships could play an important role in understanding and managing vulnerability at a local level, but require proper resourcing to do so. Greater cross-sector work is needed to clarify interdependencies and ensure adequate levels of resilience.
About the authors:
Susan Brush is a doctoral student of future power networks and smart grids at the University of Strathclyde. Prior to joining the university, Susan spent a number of years working at Tata Steel.